This is the first English-language military history of what the People's Republic of China called the "War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea." Based upon a vast array of recently available Chinese sources, it provides a revealing new look at the far-reaching influence of Mao Zedong's political and military thought on China's conduct of the war.

As Shu Guang Zhang reminds us, many observers in 1950 thought it foolhardy for this young and underdeveloped communist nation to engage in yet another war. Coming so soon after its costly civil war with the Nationalists, the Korean crisis presented China with the uninviting prospect of fighting a technologically superior (and nuclear-armed) opponent on foreign terrain.

Mao, however, was convinced from more than a decade of fighting against the Japanese and the Nationalists that political gain and warfare were inseparable. ("Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," he'd declared as early as 1927.) Zhang argues that war in Korea offered Mao yet another opportunity to expand and consolidate his political power at home, while at the same time uniting the Chinese proletariat against Yankee imperialism and proving to the international community that China had arrived as a major world power.

As Zhang shows, Mao's decision to go to war against the United States was guided by a devoutly romantic belief that human forces would always triumph over modern technology. Victory, according to Mao, did not necessarily go to those who had bigger and better guns. It was reserved instead for those who possessed an unwavering commitment to a superior cause.

Merging the martial thought of both Clausewitz and Sun-Tze with Marx's concept of class struggle, Mao galvanized China's military and citizenry at every level to fight a people's war against Yankee imperialism. Fueled by Mao's call to safeguard China and East Asia from American invasions, the Chinese showed how a relatively outgunned but inspired fighting force could deprive a technologically superior opponent of victory in a limited war. As Zhang concludes, subsequent conflicts in Vietnam and elsewhere have proven the value of that lesson.

'This book brings back memories of the great Alex Rich, a pioneer in molecular biology. He was friend, a mentor and a colleague who contributed greatly to the understanding of living processes and molecular structures.'David Baltimore1975 Nobel Laureate in Physiology or MedicineThis book is intended for students and general readers who are interested in the structures of biological molecules and history of science. The center of gravity of Alexander Rich's work is on nucleic acids and their structures and their roles in biology, but the breadth of his work is nearly unparalleled. Alex Rich published important early discoveries on the structure and activity of RNA, information transfer (translation) from RNA to protein, the structure of ribosomes with insights into polyribosome functions, the first atomic-resolution structure of nucleic acid base pairings, and the discovery of a hitherto-unknown conformation of DNA. Many of Rich's articles also have a focus on the structure of proteins in general as well as specific proteins and some are concerned with the structure of viruses. Some of Rich's early experimental work is based on scattering of X-rays from fibers but X-ray diffraction from crystals became the dominating technique of the Cold War.This is a book full of rich history of early days of modern biology and many fundamental discoveries. Alex Rich's main focus throughout his long career was on nucleic acids. His first paper on nucleic acids, was published together with JD Watson. Two years later, Rich reported creating fibers of poly-Uracil and poly-Adenine and studied their structures by diffraction.Alex Rich's laboratory determined the high resolution crystal structures of the ApU and GpC fragments of double helical RNA from Rich's group is considered a landmark in the detailed understanding of nucleic acid structure.

"Beijing's Economic Statecraft during the Cold War, 1949-1991, " describes China's use of economic instruments in pursuit of foreign policy goals from its foundation to the end of the Cold War. Taking on China's economic diplomacy during the period of 1949-1991 as an in-depth case analysis, Shu Guang Zhang focuses on the nuts and bolts of Beijing's policymaking and aims to reconstruct China's economic statecraft behaviors, both historically and conceptually. Not only does the study assess China's foreign economic policies playing out in its relations with the U.S., U.K., and Japan, but it also looks at how Moscow, Hanoi, Pyongyang, Tirana, and Ulan Bator interacted with Beijing in their political economic relations.

This book provides a thorough analysis of the evolution of land property rights and transfer mechanism during the transition of the Chinese society from being a traditional self-sustaining agricultural society to a modern commercialized agricultural society. It provides empirical proof for complicated property rights theories and a solution and path for land capitalization. It discloses that in practice, land ownership may not be the essence and knot of the problem, and that the implementation of land property rights really matters.The book also provides a series of pragmatic solutions and measures to improve the current land law system and land policy in China. It stresses the importance of a pragmatic research methodology that is based on arguments on real life research and evidence, which may help promote a more grounded research atmosphere in the Chinese academia.

Why would one country impose economic sanctions against another in pursuit of foreign policy objectives? How effective is the use of economic weapons in attaining such objectives? To answer these questions, the author examines how and why the United States and its allies instituted economic sanctions against the People's Republic of China in the 1950s, and how the embargo affected Chinese domestic policy and the Sino-Soviet alliance.
The literature on sanctions has largely concluded that they tend to be ineffective in achieving foreign policy objectives. This study, based on recently declassified documents in the United States, Great Britain, China, and Russia, is unusual in that it looks at both sides of "the China embargo." It concludes that economic sanctions provide, in certain circumstances, an attractive alternative to military intervention (especially in the nuclear age) or to doing nothing. The author argues that while the immediate effects may be meager or nil, the indirect and long-term effects may be considerable; in the case he reexamines, the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Anti-Rightist campaign were in part prompted by the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies. Finally, though the embargo created difficulties within the Western alliance, Beijing was driven to press the USSR for much greater economic assistance than Moscow thought feasible, and the ensuing disagreements between them contributed to the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance.
Going beyond the rational choice approach to international relations, the book reflects on the role of mutual perceptions and culturally bound notions in shaping international economic sanctions. In addition to contributing to a better understanding of the economic aspects of Cold War history, the book attempts to give more empirical substance to the developing concept of "economic diplomacy," "economic statecraft," or "economic warfare" and to relate it to the idea of conflict management.